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Abstract
Since 1999, gasoline prices in California, Illinois and Wisconsin have spiked occa-
sionally well above gasoline prices in nearby states. In May and June 2000, for example,
gasoline prices in Chicago rose twenty eight cents per gallon to $2.13, while prices na-
tionally rose only nine to $1.73. Several qualitative studies identify unique gasoline
formulations in California, Illinois and Wisconsin as crucial factors related to regional
price spikes. This paper provides the first quantitative estimates of two distinct effects
of state-level gasoline content regulations in California, Illinois and Wisconsin: (i) the
effect of increased production costs associated with additional refining necessary to
meet content criteria, and (ii) the effect of incompatibility between these blends and
gasoline meeting federal reformulated gasoline (RFG) standards. Using a structural
model based on the production optimization problem of refiners, I simulate wholesale
prices for jet fuel, diesel and four blends of gasoline in each geographic market. I then
specify a counterfactual in which gasoline in the three states only met federal RFG
requirements. Using a constructed dataset of refinery outages, I am able to separately
identify each effect. Using a similar methodology, I also estimate the effect of two other
factors thought to increase gasoline prices, (i) changes in refinery ownership and (ii)
limited expansion of domestic refining capacity.
Point estimates for the effect of increased refining costs are 4.5, 3.0 and 2.9 cents
per gallon in California, Illinois and Wisconsin. The effect of incompatibility with
federal RFG criteria, conditional on an in-state refinery outage, is 4.8, 6.6 and 7.1
cents per gallon in California, Illinois and Wisconsin. Controlling for the magnitude
of local outages in these areas, I estimate that 72, 92 and 91 percent of price spikes
created by local refinery outages could be mitigated by compatibility with federal RFG
standards. I find that changes in refinery ownership in the late 1990’s increase prices
by 1.4 to 1.5 cpg in Illinois and Wisconsin and by 0.73 cents per gallon in California.
A five-percent increase in domestic refining capacity reduces prices 3.7 to 3.8 cents per
gallon in Illinois and Wisconsin and 4.3 cents per gallon in California.
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1 Introduction
Much of the recent interest in gasoline prices has focused on regional gasoline price
spikes, that is price spikes geographically limited in scope from the city-level to the size
of several states. An example of one such price spike occured in Chicago and Milwaukee
in May and June, 2000. From May 30 to June 20, average prices of reformulated
gasoline in Chicago and Milwaukee rose from $1.85 and $1.74 a gallon to as high as
$2.13 and $2.02 a gallon. By July 24, gasoline prices dropped to $1.57 and $1.48
respectively.1 In contrast, the national average price for reformulated gasoline during
the same period varied less, rising from $1.64 on May 29, 2000 to $1.73 on June 19,
2000 and finally dropping back to $1.66 on July 24, 2000.2 Similar price spikes are
seen easily in Figures 1 and 2. Figure 1 shows the monthly average wholesale price
for gasoline sold in the Chicago MSA and in California, along with the most closely
tracked domestic spot price for crude oil, West Texas Intermediate (WTI) delivered to
Cushing, OK. Figure 2 displays the differential between the two gasoline price series
and the WTI crude spot price.
In Figure 2, price spikes in California and Illinois are apparent. Prior to 1999,
wholesale gasoline prices in California and Illinois were, with a few exceptions, ten to
thirty cents per gallon more expensive that the WTI crude spot price. Beginning in
early 1999, though, wholesale prices in California and Illinois began to increase period-
ically above this established range. From January 1999 to December 2003, wholesale
gasoline prices in Illinois spiked to more than forty cents per gallon above the WTI
crude spot price on four occasions, with the largest spike, in Spring 2000, when gasoline
prices spiked to over 70 cents per gallon above the WTI crude spot price. Over a similar
period, California wholesale gasoline prices spiked over forty cents per gallon above the
WTI spot price on nine occasions. In response to regional price spikes, several academic
papers along with research by the FTC, EPA, Senate Subcommittee on Investigations
and state commissions qualitatively analyzed structural changes in regional gasoline
markets contributing to these spikes.3 These studies identify three structural changes
in the gasoline markets that potentially increase the frequency of regional price spikes:
(1) inconsistent gasoline content regulations across different geographic regions, (2) de-
clining reserve refining capacity, and (3) industry consolidation within the oil industry.
In addition, these studies often identify incident-specific factors, including refinery out-
ages, transportation constraints, reductions in product inventories, or transition costs
associated with meeting new environmental regulations.
All studies identify the first factor, regional content regulations, as an important
industry change related to regional price spikes. Over the past ten years, state and
local regulations dictating the content of gasoline have reduced the fungibility of the
domestic gasoline supply. In 1992, domestic gasoline met a single set of content stan-
dards. Ten years later, over fifteen different, and in some cases, mutually exclusive,
blends of gasoline are mandated in different geographic areas. A simple model of
quantity competition suggests gasoline content regulation likely has three distinct ef-
fects on gasoline prices.4 First, blends of gasoline meeting content regulations are more
1Final Report of the Federal Trade Commission on the Midwest Price Spikes, March 21, 2001
2EIA Motor Gasoline Watch; May 29, 2000; June 19, 2000; July 24, 2000.
3See for instance, Bulow, Creswell, Fischer and Taylor (2003) and “Gasoline Prices - How Are They
Really Set?” (2002)
4See Muehlegger (2002) for a discussion of gasoline content regulations and potential effects on refiners,
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costly to refine than conventional gasoline. Second, additional refining costs associated
with state-specific content regulations might influence which geographic regions refin-
ers choose to serve. Finally, incompatible blends of gasoline may reduce the ability
of refiners and marketers to move gasoline between geographic regions in response to
supply and demand shocks. Of these, the first two are persistent effects, while the third
only affects prices in the event of an unexpected supply or demand shock. The effect of
the third, though, depends crucially on the degree of geographic differentiation across
regions sharing compatible fuel standards. For example, little gasoline meeting federal
reformulated gasoline (RFG) standards is sold in the Midwest. Even if gasoline in
Illinois and Milwaukee were compatible with federal RFG, transportation costs from
locations producing federal RFG might be sufficient to limit refiners in other RFG-
producing areas from sending gasoline to Chicago in response to a refinery outage. In
this case, the transportation costs between geographic markets rather than the product
heterogeneity would contribute most significantly to price spikes resulting from a local
shock.
While previous government and academic studies identify factors which contribute
to regional price spikes, no study quantifies the effect. This paper answers this question
by providing a structural method which allows me to distinguish the effect of prod-
uct heterogeneity from incompatible content regulations from the effect of geographic
differentiation caused by transportation costs. In particular, I focus on the effects
on price levels and price spikes of the two most stringent regional blends of gasoline,
ethanol-blended RFG sold in Chicago and Milwaukee and California Air Resources
Board (CARB) gasoline sold throughout California. In addition to analyzing the effect
of these regional gasoline content regulations, I simulate counterfactuals controlling for
refinery consolidation and declining reserve refining capacity. These simulations esti-
mate the effect changes in refinery ownership and the slow growth of refining capacity
have on wholesale gasoline prices.
To quantify each of these effects, I specify a structural model of the refining industry
based on the production optimization problem faced by individual refineries, including
unobserved cost, conduct and elasticity parameters. Although the likelihood function
for the structural model cannot be expressed in closed form, I numerically search
for values of the unobservable parameters in the model that minimize the squared
error between the solution to the optimization problem and the actual market-level
production. Using values for parameters from the NLLS search algorithm, I then
simulate prices of wholesale gasoline in Illinois, Wisconsin and California as if the
states sold federal RFG instead of ethanol-blended RFG and CARB gasoline. This
approach controls for transportation costs, refinery capacity constraints, changes in
refinery ownership and gasoline compatibility. In order to distinguish the effects of
content regulations on price levels and price volatility, I build a dataset of unexpected
refinery outages. The set of refinery outages allows me to identify months with and
without unexpected local supply shocks and hence months in which local gasoline
content regulations affect prices in Illinois, Wisconsin and California through only
increased production costs. Comparing simulated prices in months with and without
local refinery outages separately identifies the effects of additional production costs
of CARB gasoline and ethanol-blended RFG from the effects of incompatibility with
federal RFG.
transporters and marketers of gasoline.
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Section II discusses the relevant economic literature. Section III provides a back-
ground on content regulations and the refining industry, focusing in particular on why
regulation of gasoline content and refinery outages effect wholesale gasoline prices and
the relationship between the effects. Section IV details the data used and section V
presents reduced-form estimates of the effect of content regulations on price levels. In
section VI, I propose a model of gasoline refining which allows me to estimate the effect
of content regulations on regional price spikes and then estimate unobservable param-
eters of the model in section VII. In Section VIII, I specify my primary counterfactual
and simulate the effect of the content regulations on regional wholesale gasoline price
volatility. In addition, I also simulate alterative counterfactuals and test the robust-
ness of the results to both modelling assumptions and the coefficients of the estimated
structural parameters. Section IX concludes.
2 Previous Literature
This paper addresses two aspects of regional gasoline prices: (i) regional price volatility,
changes in prices over time and (ii) price dispersion, differences in prices across state
or regional markets. Several strands of literature relate to the topic and approach in
this paper.
A considerable number of papers study gasoline price adjustment in response to
shocks. These studies identify two empirical regularities observed in gasoline markets:
prices are sticky and prices adjust asymmetrically upwards and downwards. Explana-
tions for the former include supply adjustment costs (Borenstein and Shepard, 2000),
or menu-cost adjustment (Davis and Hamilton NBER 2003). The literature on asym-
metric price adjustment focuses on crude oil price shocks (Borenstein, Cameron and
Gilbert, 1997, and Bacon, 1991), but also addresses differences in search costs associ-
ated with different petroleum products (Johnson, 2002).
A second strand of literature estimates reduced-form effects of state-level regulatory
policies, including as divorcement regulation (Vita, 2000), self-service bans (Vandegrift
and Bisti, 2001 and Johnson and Romeo, 2000), and sales-below-cost laws (Anderson
and Johnson, 1999). These studies exploit cross-state variation in regulation or within-
state changes in regulation over time, to estimate the effect of regulations on price
levels.
This paper departs from a strictly reduced-form approach used in previous studies
in favor of a structural approach like that used in Considine (2001) and Considine and
Heo (2002), specifying a structural model based on the production optimization prob-
lem faced by individual domestic refineries. These studies incorporate a multiproduct
optimal production problem of refiners into a structural model, considering refinery
production of not only gasoline, but also jet fuel, distillate and other products. Unlike
Considine and Considine and Heo, which aggregate individual refiner behavior into
national prices and inventories, this paper optimizes the production decisions for indi-
vidual refineries on a state-formula level. The production choice of individual refineries
are modelled in light of refinery supply adjustment costs identified in Borenstein and
Shepard (2000) and Muehlegger (2002). This approach allows me to control for fac-
tors that affecting regional price levels and volatility, but difficult to incorporate in a
reduced-form approach, including refinery production constraints, changes in refinery
ownership, transportation costs and gasoline product differentiation.
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In addition to estimating the effect of regulations on price levels and spikes, this
paper also identifies the extent to product heterogeneity and geographic differentiation
contribute to product differentiation of wholesale gasoline markets in California, Illinois
and Wisconsin. Although different in approach, Pinske, Slade and Brett (2002) assess
a similar question. Pinske, Slade and Brett use a semiparametric model to identify the
geographic limits of domestic wholesale gasoline markets. While their approach does
not rely on industry-specific structural details, the structure I impose on my model
allows for the simulation of several counterfactuals.
3 Industry Overview
3.1 Wholesale Gasoline Sales
3.1.1 Vertical Industry Structure
The domestic petroleum products industry consists of several vertically-structured
tiers: (i) Refining of crude oil, (ii) Transportation of refined products by pipeline
or barge to regional terminals, (iii) Storage and wholesale sale at regional terminals,
(iv) Transportation by truck to retail stations and (v) Retail sale. I first discuss the
general technology and spatial organization of the industry and then discuss how the
specific industry characteristics contribute to wholesale price volatility spikes.
Refineries perform the initial production step, separating crude oil into different
intermediate product streams. Depending on the production units, some refineries
alter the chemical properties of these streams (e.g. desulfurization). After any alter-
ations, the refiner blends the streams into a variety of end-products.5 End products
are classified into light products, including gasoline, jet fuel, kerosene and diesel fuel,
and heavier products, which include industrial products such as fuel oil and coke. The
chemical properties of light products allow them to be sold to consumers at relatively
high prices, while the heavy products are sold generally to industrial customers at lower
prices. Due to the relative price premium associated with light products, the refiners
maximize production of light products subject to capacity constraints of refinery pro-
duction units. Although refiners maximize light product production, refiners trade off
production between light products in response to relative prices. In total, domestic re-
fineries produce the vast majority of domestically-consumed light products, accounting
for approximately ninety percent of gasoline, jet fuel and diesel consumption in 2001.6
Spatially, domestic refineries are concentrated geographically in Texas, Louisiana
and California, with over fifty percent of national distillation capacity located in the
three states.7 Remaining domestic refining capacity is sited near specific end markets
5End-products include everything from propane, gasoline and diesel fuel to industrial fuel oil and residuum
for road tar. These products vary along many dimensions, including boiling point, energy content, and
octane number. Depending on the use of the end-product, the product must meet criteria along the various
dimension. This, in turn, dictates which intermediate streams a refiner can combine to create the product.
6Although international imports vary significantly by region, even in the area with the greatest prod-
uct imports, the East Coast, imports accounted for 22, 21 and 23 percent of gasoline, jet fuel and diesel
consumption.
7Distillation is the first step in the refining process, where the refinery heats and separates crude oil based
on boiling point. As of January 1, 2002, total domestic atmospheric distillation capacity was 17.6 million
barrels per day - 25, 16 and 12 percent of this capacity was located in Texas, Louisiana and California
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(e.g. New Jersey and Illinois) or other sources of crude oil (e.g. Wyoming). As a result
of the geographic concentration of refining assets, the East Coast, upper Midwest
and occasionally the West Coast import gasoline from the Gulf Coast to meet regional
demand. To supply these markets, refiners ship petroleum products by barge or pipeline
to regional wholesale terminals located throughout the United States.
Wholesale terminals serve as a point of sale for industrial and wholesale customers
and as a short-term storage point. From the terminal, gasoline is sold to retail sta-
tions either at the Dealer Tank Wagon (DTW) price or the Rack price, depending on
whether or not the terminal operator provides truck transportation from the terminal
to the retail station. Since transportation by truck is substantially more expensive
than transportation by barge or pipeline, wholesale terminals are located proximate
to most metropolitan areas and serve retail stations located within or near the metro
area.
I focus on two crucial aspects of refinery operation which contribute to price volatil-
ity and inform my structural model introduced in section 6. First, substantial supply
adjustment costs exist due to both specifics of refinery operation and the spatial organi-
zation of the industry. Second, refiners must occasionally stop production unexpectedly
due to fires, explosions or other accidents. Slow response by unaffected refiners to lo-
calized supply outages creates regional price volatility, which regional content criteria
exacerbate.
3.1.2 Refinery Operation and Price Volatility
Two aspects of domestic refining affect the speed at which refiners respond to local
shocks, (i) supply adjustment costs and (ii) transportation lags between geographic
markets. Supply adjustment costs exist since it is costly for a refinery to deviate from
an pre-planned production schedule. Supply adjustment costs arise since refiners must
contract in advance for crude oil and optimize refinery operation based on the crude
properties. Refiners contract for crude oil, several months prior to production, based
on the properties of the crude, expected demand for end-products and existing refinery
capital. The properties of the chosen crude oil and the processing units at a particular
refinery in turn define the set of end-products a particular refinery can produce. Just
prior to production, a refiner re-optimizes refinery production based on updated prices
and the specifications of the crude oil.
While refiners can adjust the mix of end-products they produce in the long run, by
purchasing different crude oils and changing the operation of the refinery, significant
production adjustment costs exist in the short run, when the crude oil choice is fixed
and changes to refinery operation necessitate slowing production. Once the production
run begins, a refiner must either alter the operation of production units or blend
intermediate streams in a different way to achieve a different mix of end-products.
A refinery can often only increase the quantity of one high-value end-product, such
as gasoline, by blending a greater proportion of high quality intermediate streams.8
respectively.
8Like refined end-products, the properties of intermediate streams from individual processing units differ
significantly. For example, straight run gasoline, extracted directly from the distillation tower, has low octane
value (70-75) and high Reid vapor pressure, while alkylate has higher octane (90-95) and lower Reid vapor
pressure. In order to produce gasoline meeting RVP limits and minimum octane content, these two streams,
along with others, must be blended together.
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This leaves the refinery with more lower value petroleum streams it either must blend
into an end-product, reducing its quality, or sell at a low price on the market. Thus, a
refinery incurs significant costs when altering the production mix after a production run
begins. In addition, adjustment costs are greatest for end-products meeting the highest
specifications, such as gasoline. These products require a refiner to make large changes
in blending to continue to meet content requirements for different fuels. As a result
of supply adjustment costs, refiners plan production runs several months in advance,
beginning when they contract for the crude oil and plan initial refinery operation.
During the production runs, which generally lasting three to six weeks, the refiner
makes only small changes to the mix of end-products and to the operation of particular
units. Since refiners often finish production runs prior to adjusting production mix,
supply adjustment costs slow refinery response to supply or demand shocks.9
Transportation legs also slow industry response to localized shocks. As mentioned
above, domestic refineries are relatively concentrated. Geographic concentration of
refineries implies areas with less refining capacity than demand (e.g. Midwest and
East Coast) must import petroleum products from areas with excess supply (e.g. Gulf
Coast).10 Even if refineries could and did adjust production immediately in response
to shocks, the time to transport gasoline by barge or pipeline also slows the response
of the market to a shock. It takes ten to fourteen days to pipe gasoline from the Gulf
Coast to Chicago and fourteen to twenty-two days to pipe gasoline from the Gulf Coast
to Newark. A similar three week lag exists to barge gasoline from the Gulf Coast to
California.
The presence of supply adjustment costs and transportation delays do not necessar-
ily imply a market with regional price spikes. In addition to these two factors, a source
of unexpected regional supply or demand shocks must exist and regional inventories
must be insufficient to mitigate the supply or demand shocks. I focus on exogenous
refinery outages, caused by fires, explosions or lightning, as significant regional supply
shocks. Although wholesale terminals do carry inventories, inventories held constitute
only two to three weeks of consumption. In addition, although inventories exist, oper-
ational constraints of storage limit the degree to which storage can mitigate a supply
shock caused by a large refinery outage.
3.2 Content Regulations and Boutique Fuels
An additional industry feature, which increases the effect of refinery outages on do-
mestic gasoline prices, is that gasoline is a differentiated product, due to state-level
gasoline composition regulation.11 In 1992, the Amendments to the Clean Air Act
initially mandated federal content criteria for gasoline in regions failing to meet EPA
limits for ozone and carbon monoxide pollution. Recognizing that mobile-source air
pollution depends not only on emissions, but also on the climate, the 1992 Amendments
mandated three broad regional classes of gasoline, conventional, oxygenated and refor-
mulated gasoline (RFG), designing oxygenated gasoline to reduce carbon emissions and
9See Muehlegger(2002) and Borenstein and Shepard (2001) for a discussion of supply adjustment costs
in crude oil refining.
10Gulf Coast refineries produced roughly 57 and 16 percent of wholesale gasoline consumed in PADD 1
(East Coast) and PADD 2 (Midwest), respectively, in 2001.
11See Muehlegger(2002) for a summary of state and federal gasoline content regulations.
7
RFG to limit ground-level ozone pollution. For each of these blends of gasoline, the
federal regulations specify standards for two general gasoline characteristics: oxygen
content and volatility. Increasing the amount of oxygen in gasoline improves the com-
bustion of gasoline when the weather is cold and reduces carbon monoxide emissions.
Decreasing volatility reduces the propensity of gasoline to evaporate and reduces ozone
emissions.12 The EPA mandate only specifies minimum standards, though allowing
states to supplement the federally-mandated content requirements, either by voluntar-
ily imposing federal requirements or by mandating more strict regulations than the
federal standards.13 As a result of supplementary standards, in 2001, fifteen distinct
blends of gasoline were used in the lower 48 states.
Of states imposing more strict regulations, California, Illinois and Wisconsin most
radically depart from the federal standards.14 Standards for California Air Resource
Board (CARB) gasoline limit the proportion of gasoline derived from particular inter-
mediate streams and require gasoline to meet a sulfur cap. RFG sold in Illinois and
Wisconsin must meet identical volatility and oxygen content standard to federal RFG,
but must meet the oxygen content requirement with ethanol. Ethanol’s volatility is
high relative to other oxygenates, such as MTBE, and as a result, refiners must create
a very low volatility gasoline to blend with ethanol to meet the volatility requirement
of federal RFG. As a result, gasoline meeting federal RFG requirements cannot be
sold in areas requiring CARB gasoline or ethanol-blended RFG. It is also important
to note that not only does federal RFG fail to meet the content specifications of these
two blends of gasoline, but CARB gasoline and ethanol-blended RFG are mutually
incompatible.
In this paper, I focus specifically on the effects of CARB and ethanol-blended RFG
since, unlike other regulations, these require refinery-level production adjustments to
meet content specification. These are in contrast to oxygenated gasoline, which only
requires refiners to supplement the oxygen content of conventional gasoline. Increasing
production of either CARB gasoline or Ethanol-blended RFG requires a refinery to alter
the blending of intermediate streams and potentially entails supplementary processing
(eg. the removal of sulfur for CARB gasoline). Thus, these fuels are the ones most
likely to entail substantial supply adjustment costs, and the ones most likely to be
affected by unexpected supply shocks.
3.2.1 Other Changes Contemporaneous with Content Regulations
Complicating an analysis of price spikes are structural changes in the industry con-
current with changing content regulations. Substantial industry consolidation has oc-
curred over the past decade. 15 Although required asset divestiture limited increases
12Ground-level ozone increase with temperature, as evaporative emissions increase, and also increases as
a function of sunlight. Hence, ozone emissions rise in summer, in warm climates. Alternatively, carbon
emissions increase with incomplete combustion associated with starting a cold engine, and are more of a
problem in cold climates during the winter.
13Opt-in to the federal RFG program accounts for approximately one-third of RFG consumption.
14Although the focus of this paper, Illinois, Wisconsin and California are not alone in mandating special
blends of gasoline. Currently, 15 different blends of gasoline exist across the country. For an in-depth
discussion of boutique fuels and the potential effects, see Muehlegger(2002).
15Large horizontal mergers in the petroleum industry include British Petroleum and Amoco in 1998, Exxon
and Mobil in 1999 and BP/Amoco and Arco in 2000.
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in refinery concentration, changes in ownership still may affect competition between
refineries. In addition to industry consolidation, there has also been a trend toward
decreasing reserve refining capacity over the past twenty years. In 1981, annual refin-
ery production was 68 percent of refinery capacity.16 Due to closure of old refineries,
increasing demand and only incremental changes to refining capacity at existing sites
over the past twenty years, current utilization of refining capacity exceeds 95 percent.
As a result, unexpected refinery outages could increase local wholesale prices simply
by virtue of little spare production capacity existing in the current industry.
3.3 Regional Price Volatility and Refinery Outages
This paper examines the extent to which content regulations in Illinois, Wisconsin and
California contribute to gasoline price volatility resulting from unexpected refinery
outages.17 Fires and explosions at refineries are unpredictable, localized, and, in many
cases, necessitate maintenance of a significant portion of the local refining capacity. An
example of such an event is the fire that damaged the Lemont, IL distillation unit on
August 14, 2001, closing the refinery for six weeks and reducing production for several
months thereafter. While not the largest refinery in Illinois, Lemont accounts for 16
percent of Illinois’ distillation capacity.
The geographic nature of refining and transportation, local content regulation and
supply adjustment costs have the potential to contribute to regional price volatility. In
the event of an outage of a plant producing either ethanol-blended reformulated gasoline
or California Air Resources Board gasoline, such as the Lemont refinery, incompatible
standards prevent nearby refiners producing other gasoline blends from selling them in
these areas. In addition to transportation lags and supply adjustment costs, which slow
the speed at which refineries respond to shocks, incompatible content regulations might
additionally constraint refinery response to supply shocks. Thus, these regulations have
the potential to compound the effects of a unexpected refinery outage, especially in
the case of gasoline formulations with no substitutes such as ethanol-blended RFG or
CARB gasoline.
4 Data
I collect two sets of data that I use to estimate reduced-form and structural models: (i)
market-level prices and quantities, and (ii) refinery-level data influencing production
decisions, such as oil prices, transportation costs and refinery outages.
The price and quantity data, from the Energy Information Administration (EIA)
Petroleum Marketing Monthly, consist of monthly observations of average rack price
and total wholesale quantity for the three major light petroleum products, gasoline,
No.2 distillate (home heating oil and diesel fuel) and jet fuel. I use seven years of
observations, beginning Jan 1995 and ending with Dec 2001, after the Midwest and
California price spikes of 2000 and 2001. For gasoline, the EIA data tracks prices
16See Dazzo, N., Lidderdale, T., and N. Masterson, ”U.S. Refining Capacity Utilization,” Energy Infor-
mation Administration, Petroleum Supply Monthly
17Pipeline outages, which are not explicitly modelled in this paper, can act in a similar manner to supply
shocks. As an example, a pipeline outage contributed to high gasoline prices in Phoenix, AZ in September
2003.
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and volumes monthly by state and federal formulation standard (RFG, oxygenated,
and conventional gasoline).18 For prices in both the reduced-form regressions and
the structural model, I use average monthly rack price net of taxes for each state-
formulation combination for gasoline. The “rack” price is the wholesale price paid at
the terminal and does not include any transportation costs from the terminal to the
individual stations. The EIA data do not differentiate between branded rack sales (eg.
sales of Chevron gasoline) and unbranded rack sales. For diesel and jet fuel, I use
regional average monthly prices net of taxes of product sold for resale in each of eight
petroleum area defense districts PADDs.19 Volumes for all products are prime sup-
plier volumes, sales by wholesale marketers to retailers. This classification represents
the closest analogy to wholesale volumes. To verify that prime supplier volumes are
representative of wholesale gasoline volumes, I compare the EIA prime supplier gaso-
line volumes to state-reported monthly wholesale gasoline sales reported to the Federal
Highway Administration.20
The EIA PetroleumMarketing Monthly only tracks gasoline sales by federal-formulation
standard, and does not specifically track regional blends exceeding federal require-
ments. Although sales of CARB gasoline or ethanol-blended reformulated gasoline are
not identified in the EIA data, both gasoline blends meet federal-RFG standards and
are reported as such in the dataset. In addition, no other gasoline blends in California,
Illinois and Wisconsin meet federal RFG standards. Thus, I attribute all reported RFG
sales in these states as either a sale of CARB gasoline or ethanol-blended RFG depend-
ing on the state. For the structural model, I aggregate conventional and oxygenated
gasoline since oxygenated gasoline is only differentiated from conventional gasoline by
the addition of oxygenate at the refinery or terminal and does not require incremental
refinery-level processing. Therefore, the structural model focuses on six light petroleum
products, four of which are distinct blends of gasoline: (i) conventional gasoline, (ii)
federal-mandate reformulated gasoline, (iii) ethanol-blended RFG, (iv) California Air
Resources Board (CARB) gasoline, (v) jet fuel or kerosene, and (vi) diesel fuel or
number two distillate fuel. As a result, my panel of market-level data consist of 84
monthly observations for each of 62 markets for gasoline, defined by state and federal
formulation standards, eight regional markets for jet fuel and eight regional markets
for diesel fuel.21
To simulate refinery behavior, I construct several datasets covering (i) ownership
18Ideally, the relevant market for wholesale gasoline would be at the terminal-formulation level. While
state-level data does not bias the estimate of persistent effects of content regulation, it would lead to a
conservative estimate of the effect of content regulation on price spikes if within-state transportation costs
are sufficient to limit arbitrage between terminals within the same state, in the event on a local refinery
outage and spike within a particular area.
19Roughly corresponding to the Northeast (1a), Mid-atlantic (1b), South-east (1c), Midwest (2), Gulf
Coast (3), Rocky Mountains (4) and West Coast (5).
20Although FHA data only report wholesale gasoline sales aggregated across federal formulation standards,
I similarly aggregated EIA data for purposes of comparison. Aside from several instances of reporting or
recording error in the FHA data, same-state same-month observations from the EIA data and the FHA data
were, on average, within three percent of each other.
21Sixty two gasoline markets are the result of some states having multiple formulations over the study
period. For example, outside of the Milwaukee area, Wisconsin stations sell conventional gasoline. From
January 1, 1995 until December 31, 1995, Milwaukee stations sold federal RFG while from January 1, 1996
on, Milwaukee stations sold ethanol-oxygenated RFG. For purposes of this paper, each of these is treated as
a separate market for gasoline.
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and capacity of refineries, (ii) crude oil and transportation costs, (iii) refinery outage
information, and (iv) petroleum product imports. For the simulation, I construct
a comprehensive dataset of refinery ownership, closures and capacity over the study
period from the EIA Petroleum Supply Annual and annual surveys conducted by the
EIA of petroleum capacity at domestic refineries. While the annual surveys do identify
the capacity of various production units at refineries, they do not explicitly define
production capacity of gasoline, diesel and jet fuel at these refineries. I use a function
of distillation and cracking capacity to calculate the production limit of light products
at these refineries, based on crude oil assays which specify the mix of light products
derivable from West Texas Intermediate at a simple (distillation only) refinery.22 Of
the 173 domestic refineries operating at some point during the study period, I consider
the subset of 117 refineries located in the contiguous US with light product production
capacity exceeding eight hundred thousand gallons per day. This subset of refiners
contains over ninety-five percent of estimated domestic light product capacity.23
Crude oil costs for refineries are monthly average purchase prices of crude oil tracked
by the EIA, adjusted for transportation. For refineries located in the Midwest or East
Coast, I use the spot price of West Texas Intermediate at Cushing, OK, adjusted for
pipeline transportation costs from Cushing to the refinery location. For refineries in
Wyoming, Montana and Utah, I use a crude spot price for Wyoming Sour, and for re-
fineries on the West Coast, I use an average spot price for Alaskan North Shore crude
and California Offshore crude, all of which I adjust for transportation costs.24 Trans-
portation costs for petroleum products by pipelines, barges and trucks are estimates
presented before the Federal Trade Commission of 2, 4.5 and 30 cents per gallon per
thousand miles of transportation.25 I identify each refinery’s ability to serve each of
the 78 markets described above using several sources. Maps of refineries and petroleum
product pipelines determine pipeline access of each refinery. In addition, since pipelines
are unidirectional, I use these maps to determine the markets each refinery is able to
serve by pipeline. Access to barge transportation is determined either by proximity to
water or access to pipelines serving water-proximate storage terminals. Transportation
costs for each refinery-state combination are then calculated as the least cost method
of serving the state from the refinery. For example, a refinery in Texas with access to
barges is assumed to serve Nevada markets by barging product from Texas to California
and then shipping that product by pipeline from California to Nevada. While I do not
explicitly model pipeline constraints in this paper, omitting pipeline constraints would
lead to a conservative estimate of the effect of content regulation on price volatility.
Imports of petroleum products are small relative to domestic production - hence,
22Specifically, my production capacity at these refineries is equal to forty percent of atmospheric distilla-
tion capacity plus thermal cracking capacity plus catalytic cracking capacity plus hydrocracking capacity.
Although this is a rough measure of capacity, as crude choice effects production limits, individuals knowl-
edgeable about refining consider this a reasonable approximation of light product capacity.
23Many smaller refineries produce specialized petroleum products for industrial use and do not actively
produce gasoline, jet fuel and distillate. As a result, although these refineries account for approximately five
percent of light-product capacity, they account for a smaller proportion of light product production.
24Although different spot prices are used, crude spot prices in California, Alaska and Wyoming closely
correlate with the WTI spot price at Cushing, OK.
25See Colonial Pipeline presentation to the FTC. These values are consistent with estimates of transporta-
tion costs from the EIA’s 2003 California Gasoline Price Study.
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in the structural model, I take imports to be exogenous.26 The EIA tracks monthly
imports by petroleum district of a variety of finished petroleum products, including
gasoline by federal-formulation standard. Conventional gasoline imports are assumed
to be the sum of oxygenated imports and other gasoline imports. Jet fuel imports are
assumed to be sum of jet fuel and aviation gasoline imports. Reformulated gasoline
and distillate fuel oil are taken as reported. Since the imports of motor gasoline are re-
ported by PADD and not by state, I proportionately distribute imports to states within
each PADD based on same-month consumption of either conventional or reformulated
gasoline.
The supply shocks I exploit are unexpected refinery outages due to fires, explosions,
lightning or other unexpected events at refineries. I identify unexpected outages by
searching news, government and industry sources reporting events in the petroleum
refining industry. Sources for information on outages include regional and national
newspapers, SEC filings made by publicly-traded refiners, and incident reports by the
US Chemical Safety Board, EPA and OSHA. From Jan 1995 to Dec 2001 for the 117
domestic refineries in the sub-sample, I identify a total of 121 incidents, forty-five of
which necessitated the shutdown of one or more processing units. For each of these
incidents, I identify the processing unit or units involved, the duration of the outage,
and estimate the effect of the outage on light-product production. Table 1 lists the
unexpected outages I identify through news, regulatory and industry sources, along
with the outage date, repair date and outage severity.
5 Reduced-Form Regression
5.1 Data and Estimation
I initially use a reduced-form model to estimate the effect of gasoline content regulations
on price levels. The general specification for the panel regression I use is given by
Pijt = f(Qijt,Wijt, Regijt)
Qijt = g(Pijt, Zijt)
where i denotes state, j denotes blend, t denotes time, Pijt is the real rack price of
gasoline, Qijt is the volume of gasoline sold for resale, Wijt is a vector of production
input costs, Regijt is a vector of content regulation variables and Zijt is a vector of
income and other demographic variables. To consistently estimate the coefficients of
the first equation, I use the vector of demand factors exogenous to price, Zijt, to
instrument for quantity in the first equation. Table 2 lists descriptive statistics for
the variables used in the reduced-form model. This approach implicitly treats content
regulation as exogenous to price. Regulation is exogenous to price for areas required to
adopt either RFG or oxygenated gasoline due to non-compliance with Clean Air Act
standards. For areas opting into the federal programs, if a state decision is endogenous
to gasoline price, states for which content regulations are more costly would be less
likely to opt-in. Thus, treating regulation as purely exogenous provides a conservative
estimate of the mean price effect.
26Imports of gasoline, jet fuel and diesel fuel were 10, 10 and 9 percent of domestic consumption in 2001.
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In order to estimate coefficients for content regulation, consider the fixed-effects
panel regression corrected for AR(1) errors
Pijt = α+ β0QZijt + β1WTIt + γRegijt + νi + φijt
φijt = ijt + ρijt−1
ijt˜N(0, σ2ij)
where νi denote state fixed-effects, QZijt instrumented quantity, WTIijt West Texas
Intermediate crude oil spot price delivered to Cushing, OK, instrumented by the Brent
North Sea crude spot price, and Regijt content regulation dummy variables identifying
blends meeting oxygenated gasoline, RFG, ethanol-blended RFG and CARB gasoline
requirements.27 In subsequent specifications, I also include month-year fixed effects
and month-region fixed effects. In each of these specifications, states entering and
leaving the programs and states with more than one specification of gasoline identify
of the effect of regional content regulations. Table 3 presents the coefficients and
standard errors for three model specifications. Errors are assumed to follow an AR(1)
process within state-blend panels with a common autocorrelation coefficient ρ, and are
heteroskedastic across state-blend pairs.
I also run fixed-effects regressions for several alternative specifications. Specification
2 uses WTI crude spot price with a vector of month-year fixed effects, and specification
3 allows for month fixed effects which vary by PADD. The second specification allows
for a more flexible common time-trend than the specification including WTI crude
spot price. The third specification allows for different monthly trends for each region.
In each regression, ethanol-blended RFG and CARB gasoline dummy variables are
additive with respect to the RFG dummy. Thus, the coefficients for either the ethanol-
blended RFG or CARB dummies represent the effect on price levels from more strict
regulation, relative to federal reformulated gasoline.
Looking at the first specification, the coefficients on content regulation dummies
are positive and sign-consistent with ex-ante predictions of increased production costs
of CARB gasoline, RFG and oxygenated gasoline relative to conventional gasoline.
The coefficients of the content regulations dummies are statistically significant at the
one percent level. Relative to conventional gasoline over 1995 to 2001, oxygenated
gasoline and reformulated gasoline rack prices are 3.5 and 3.8 cents per gallon higher
than conventional gasoline. In addition, ethanol-blended RFG and CARB gasoline
rack prices are 1.8 and 3.2 cents per gallon higher than federal RFG, although each
point estimate is imprecisely estimated.28 Allowing for state-specific monthly trends
in specification 3, the estimated price effect of the regulations are 4.9 cpg and 4.2
cpg for oxygenated gasoline and federal RFG relative to conventional gasoline, and
1.7 cpg and 5.1 cpg for ethanol-blended RFG and CARB gasoline relative to federal
RFG. These estimates are consistent both with EPA estimates of the incremental cost
of federal RFG over conventional gasoline of four to eight cents per gallon, historical
27A Hausman specification test of the random effects model indicates that E[, ν] 6= 0, necessitating the
use of a fixed-effects specification.
28It is important to note that oxygenated and reformulated gasoline also have lower energy content than
conventional gasoline due to the addition of oxygenates. These blends reduce mileage per gallon in cars by
2-3 and 1-2 percent respectively. This effect is not incorporated into these regression, but would increase the
price level effect of these regulations.
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Chicago/Dallas RFG price differentials of six to eleven cents per gallon, and California
Air Resource Board estimates of incremental costs of CARB gasoline standards of five
to fifteen cents per gallon.29
5.2 Structural Model Justification
The reduced-form model provides a consistent estimate of the effect on wholesale price
levels of federal and regional gasoline content regulations. In order to identify the effect
of content regulations on regional price spikes, though, I formulate a structural model
of refinery production decisions. The structural model allows me to simulate coun-
terfactuals in which California, Illinois and Wisconsin alternatively mandate gasoline
meet only federal RFG requirements. A proper counterfactual is difficult to formulate
in the reduced-form model. For example, a counterfactual in which California gasoline
meeting only federal-RFG standards must control for transportation costs from other
sources of federal-RFG. If transportation costs are sufficiently high, compatibility with
federal-RFG standard may not mitigate the effect of an unexpected refinery outage. A
structural model allows me to control for this, by simulating the production decisions
of refiners, which incorporate transportation costs and changes in refinery ownership.
6 Structural Model of Supply Shocks
To simulate an accurate counterfactual, I specify a structural model based on the
production optimization problem of refineries, which allows me to identify the effect of
incompatible regulations coming from production costs, changes in competition due to
incremental production costs and changes in the response of refineries to unexpected
outages.
I consider a three step game in which refiners choose quantities of light petroleum
products to maximize an objective function subject to changing information about
refinery outages. Consistent with refinery planning prior to production runs, refineries
make production decisions in the first step without knowing outages. Outages are then
realized and observed by refineries. Finally, since refineries can reallocate production,
but supply adjustment costs exist, refineries re-optimize production in the final step
in response to the outage, under the constraint that the product mix chosen in the
first step is unchanged. Thus, a refinery choosing to produce federal RFG, but not
CARB gasoline, could choose to redistribute federal RFG from one market to another
in response to an outage, but can not, in the short term, choose to produce CARB
gasoline instead.
In the first step, I assume that refineries have knowledge of all supply and demand
variables with the exception of the unexpected outages occurring in the current period.
That is, prior to choosing initial production at time t, refineries know the inverse resid-
ual demand curve accounting for imports, pjt(.), in each geographic and product market
j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , J} in addition to input costs for all refineries. For each domestic refinery,
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , I}, let qijt be the initial choice of quantity in market j at time t, qit
denote the total production capacity of all light petroleum products, c(qi1, qi2, . . . , qiJ)
29See Testimony of R. Perciasepe and Testimony of C. Browner before US House of Representatives,
Commerce Committee, July 2000 (http://www.epa.gov/ocir/hearings/testimony/) and Bulow et al. at 146
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be the refinery production cost function and tij denote the transportation costs from
refinery i to market j.
In the second step, refinery outages and severity are realized and fully observed by
all refineries.
In the third step, refiners re-optimize their production decisions in response to the
realization of outages ω ∈ Ω. Refineries are allowed redistribute their production from
step 1 across geographic markets, but not across blends . Thus, I denote {J1, J2, . . . , Jn}
a proper partition of markets {1, 2, . . . , J}, where all markets sharing a given set of
content regulations belong to one element of {J1, J2, . . . , Jn}.30 Given a partition of
the markets based on product characteristics, in the third step, a refiner owning a
set of refineries I˜ ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , I} chooses a vector of Nash quantities {q˜ijt} for i ∈ I˜
to maximize an objective function consisting of own-refinery profits plus a portion of
non-own refinery profits, captured by the coefficient of competition, α.31 That is, the
objective function of a particular refiner is given by
U =
∑
i∈I˜
Πit + α
∑
i′ /∈I˜
Πi′t
where Πit is given by
Πit =
∑
j
q˜ijt(pj(.))−
∑
j
q˜ijttij − c(q˜i1t, q˜i2t, . . . , q˜iJt).
subject to non-negativity constraints and binding product-level capacity constraints
q˜ij ≥ 0 for all j ∈ J∑
j∈J1
q˜ij =
∑
j∈J1
qij∑
j∈J2
q˜ij =
∑
j∈J2
qij
. . .∑
j∈Jn
q˜ij =
∑
j∈Jn
qij
Note that in this specification, a value of α = 1 implies joint profit maximization
by all refineries and α = 0 implies a single-period game in quantities. For refineries
affected by an outage at time t and with initial production exceeding post-outage
refinery capacity, production is scaled back evenly across all products.
Prior to the realization of outages, the refinery chooses a binding production mix,
which it is then able to allocate in response to outages. Once the refinery commits to a
production mix in the first step of the optimization, it is constrained to that mix after
the realization of outages, consistent with substantial industry supply adjustment costs
30For example, J1 could denote conventional gasoline markets, J2 reformulated gasoline markets, J3 jet
fuel markets, and J4 CARB gasoline.
31See Cyert and DeGroot (1973). In this formulation, the interpretation of α is the weight an individual
refiner places on the profits of refineries it does not own. A value of α = 1 is consistent with joint profit
maximization by all refiners while a value of α = 0 implies entirely own-profit maximization.
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within, but not between, production runs. Thus, in the first step, refiners choose pre-
planned production quantities of each petroleum product to maximize the expectation,
with respect to all possible refinery outages ω ∈ Ω, of own-refinery profits plus a portion
of non-own refinery profits, α. The objective function for a refiner owning refineries
I˜ ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , I} is given by
U = E(
∑
i∈I˜
Πit) + αE(
∑
i′ /∈I˜
Πi′t),
subject to refinery capacity and non-negativity constraints
qi1 + qi2 + . . .+ qiJ ≤ qi
qij ≥ 0
for all i ∈ I˜ and all j where Πit is again
Πit =
∑
j
q˜ijt(pj(.))−
∑
j
q˜ijttij − c(q˜i1t, q˜i2t, . . . , q˜iJt).
In the first step, the expectation is taken with respect to the continuous state space
of all possible refinery outages. In order to numerically solve for the equilibrium, I
initially assume refiners place a zero prior probability on unexpected refinery outages.
Treating refineries as choosing initial quantity in this way under induces refineries
to produce less CARB and ethanol-blended RFG than they otherwise would if they
assumed an outage at a plant in California or Illinois were likely. As part of my
sensitivity analyses, I verify the robustness of my simulations to this assumption by
allowing for refineries to place a positive prior probability on a discrete subspace of
the continuum of all possible refinery outages. I find that this assumption does not
change my conclusions. Although outages have a large local effect, the probability of
an outage is low.32 When choosing production, refiners weigh the benefits of additional
CARB or ethanol-RFG production in states of the world in which a local outage occurs
California, Illinois or Wisconsin, against the incremental production costs associated
with manufacturing CARB or ethanol-RFG as well as the shadow-cost of capacity if the
refinery is capacity constrained. As a result, assuming refiners place a zero probability
prior on unexpected outages does not change refinery choice of production significantly.
When simulated, the magnitude of the effect is over an order of magnitude less than
the effect of the content regulations.
Given the specification of the game above and suppressing the time subscript, initial
choice of production for market j by refinery i satisfies the first order condition
qij
∂pj
∂qij
+
∑
k∈I˜/i
qkj
∂pj
∂qij
+
∑
k/∈I˜
qkj
∂pj
∂qij
+ pj − tij − ∂ci
∂qij
+ λi + µij = 0
where λi denotes the shadow cost of production capacity at refinery i and µij denotes
the non-negativity constraint. In the event of an refinery outage, the final choice of
32Recall that over the seven year period, news, industry and government sources document only forty-five
production-lowering outages. Over the seven year period, the expected monthly percentage of total refinery
capacity down due to an unexpected outage is 0.2 percent.
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production satisfies
qij
∂pj
∂qij
+
∑
k∈I˜/i
qkj
∂pj
∂qij
+
∑
k/∈I˜
qkj
∂pj
∂qij
+ pj − tij − ∂ci
∂qij
+ λˆi + µij = 0,
where λˆij denotes the shadow cost of the production constraint of refinery i to increase
production of a petroleum product compatible with product j. Alternatively, expressing
the FOC as a lerner-style index, the quantities of all I refineries must jointly satisfy
the set of I first order conditions for market j, given by
pj − tij − ∂ci∂qij + λi + µij
pj
=
1
ij
+
∑
k∈I˜/i
1
kj
+ α
∑
k/∈I˜
1
kj
,
where ij denotes elasticity of the residual demand curve faced by refinery i in market
j at quantity qij .
To complete the model, I make functional form assumptions for the cost and demand
functions, c(qi1, qi2, . . . , qiJ) and pjt(.). Let the refinery production cost function be
additively separable and let the marginal cost of refinery i to produce a fuel for market
j at time t be
MCijt = β0 + β1 ∗OilPriceit + β2 ∗ Log(DCit) +
β3 ∗RFGj + β4 ∗ ERFGj + β5 ∗ CARBj + β6 ∗ JFj + β7 ∗DISTj
where OilPriceit is the delivered oil price at refinery i, Log(DCit) is the log of at-
mospheric distillation capacity of refinery i, and RFGj , ERFGj ,CARBj , JFj and
DISTj are dummy variables corresponding to reformulated gasoline, ethanol-blended
RFG, CARB gasoline, jet fuel and distillate.33 This choice of functional form for the
cost function captures both the differential production costs for various products, as
well as economies of scale in refinery production, as the coefficient on the log of distil-
lation capacity. Moreover, it allows for region-specific crude prices, incorporating both
the price of local crude streams and transportation to the refinery.
I take pjt(.), the inverse demand function for market j at time t, to be linear given
by the functional form
pjt(qjt) = pAjt + (
−pAjt
qAjt
)(qjt − qAjt).
where pAjt and q
A
jt are the observed price and quantity in market j at time t. This
specification is equivalent to a first-order taylor approximation of a isoelastic demand
curve, qjt(pjt) = γ p

jt, taken at the observed price and quantity in market j at time t.
33Although other products exist, including residuum, residual oil and other light products, gasoline, dis-
tillate and jet fuel constitute the vast majority of light products produced at refineries. In addition, the
properties of each are similar enough that similar intermediate streams are used for each.
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7 Structural Estimation
7.1 Assumptions and Estimation
Absent the functional form specifications for the cost and demand functions, the three-
step model in the previous section defines a deterministic correspondence, which I
denote f : (X, θ) → Y , between factors influencing refinery supply decisions, such
as content regulations, input and transportation costs collectively denoted (X), and
the vector of unobserved parameters (θ), which includes unobserved cost, conduct and
elasticity parameters, and market-level prices and quantities (Y ).34 That is, f maps a
given state space and values for unobservable parameters to all market equilibria that
are solutions to the refinery optimization problem. Given the functional form specifi-
cations, the set of FOCs for the model simplifies to a full-rank linear problem. Thus,
the functional form assumptions provide a sufficient condition for f to be a function,
implying a unique solution to the optimization problem. Since the model contains
unobservable parameters for refinery conduct and production cost, prior to simulating
the effect of the content regulations, I first estimate the vector of unobservable cost,
conduct and elasticity parameters, θ.
In order to estimate the unobserved parameters, I introduce a stochastic error term
into the demand curve of each market, that is common to all refiners, and realized
after refiners choose quantities in each market. I take δjt ∼ N(0, σ2) to be an additive
stochastic shock to the inverse demand curve for market j from the previous section,
pjt(q) = pAjt + δjt + (
−pAjt
qAjt
)(qjt − qAjt).
I assume that δjt is independent and identically distributed across geographic areas.
Intuitively, this source of error is akin to a common market shock to a population’s
propensity to drive, unobservable to refiners. For example, unexpectedly good or poor
weather might constitute a shock to demand, common yet unpredictable to all refin-
ers serving a particular market. Linearity of the refiner FOC’s implies a structural
functional form given by the non-linear regression
Yjt = f(Xt, θ) + δjt, δjt ∼ N(0, σ2).
Due to the three-step nature of the model, the associated likelihood function cannot
be expressed as a closed function of the vector of unobserved parameters.
Thus, I numerically search for the NLLS set of parameters, that is, θˆ = argminθ((f(X, θ)−
Y )′(f(X, θ)−Y )). I estimate θˆ numerically, finding the vector of values for θ minimiz-
ing the squared error between f(X, θ) and Y via a steepest ascent search algorithm.35
As part of my robustness checks, I test the sensitivity of my simulation results to
variations in the NLLS parameter point estimates.
34The set of unobservables, denoted θ, consists of the eight cost parameters {β1, β2, . . . , β8}, the conduct
parameter α and demand elasticity parameter .
35In this case, the steepest ascent search algorithm is computationally efficient relative to a method
requiring computation of the second derivatives, such as Gauss-Newton. The seed point for the steepest
ascent algorithm, α = .15, β0 = 5, β1 = 1, β2 = −1, β3 = 5, β4 = 8, β5 = 10, β6 = −2, β7 = −4, is based
on an initial simulation of PADD 5 only and ex-ante government estimates for production costs of different
gasoline blends.
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7.2 Estimated Parameters and Interpretation
Table 4 lists the NLLS estimates for θˆ. The point estimates are consistent with ex-
pectations. The coefficient on crude cost, β1 is smaller but still relatively close to the
ex ante prediction of 1. The coefficient on log distillation capacity, β2, is less than 0
and consistent with increasing returns to distillation capacity. Cost parameters cor-
responding to differential production costs for different product blends are similar to
government and industry estimates. The incremental production costs for federal RFG
and CARB gasoline are within EPA and CARB estimates of four to eight cents and
five to fifteen cents respectively.
The competition coefficient and elasticity estimates are similar to expectations as
well. Although it is possible to reject the null hypothesis that the coefficent of compe-
tition is 0, the estimated value of α is 0.03, consistent with almost complete own-profit
maximization by refiners. Repeated interaction could enable tacit collusion amongst
refiners - in such a world, tacit collusion would reduce production below the levels
which maximize own-refiner profit in the static game. This result would be equivalent
to a result in which refiners place positive weight on the profits of other refiners, that
is a positive value of α. The small point estimate for α suggests tacit collusion is not
prevalent, consistent with the conclusions of academic and non-academic studies.36
The estimate of short-run gasoline demand elasticity is consistent with both the
meta-analysis presented in Espey(1998) and recent estimates in Considine (2001). Es-
pey finds the mean and median of 363 estimates of short run gasoline demand to be
-0.26 and -0.23, respectively. My estimate of the short run elasticity, -0.337, is slightly
more elastic than the median and mean of the sample collected in Espey, but is well
within the range of sample estimates of 0 to -1.36.37 In addition to other robustness
checks, I verify my conclusions are unchanged by using a demand elasticity of -0.23.
7.3 Model Fit
As important as reasonable estimates of the parameters is the degree to which the
structural model accurately simulates prices across the different product and geo-
graphic markets. It is also important that the model predict price spikes resulting
from unexpected refinery outages. I use two metrics to measure the fit of the simu-
lated and actual prices. By product and geographic market, I compare the first and
second moments of the simulated and actual prices, to assess whether, in aggregate,
the simulation accurately models factors which lead to differences in wholesale prices
across products and geographic markets. Table 5a and 5b list descriptive statistics for
actual and estimated prices across different petroleum products and different PADD
regions. For comparison, I include the estimated price from both the structural model
and the reduced-form model. The reduced-form and structural models draw from iden-
tical samples, with the exception that the reduced-form model does not estimate prices
for jet fuel and diesel.
Both the mean and standard deviations for the simulated wholesale prices are simi-
lar across blends and regions to mean and standard deviations of actual prices. Across
geographic regions, all estimates from the structural and reduced-form models are
36See, in particular, Bulow et al(2003) and FTC Midwest Price Spike Investigation (2001).
37As part of my robustness checks, I perform specific sensitivity tests to verify that my simulations esti-
mates are robust to the assumption of more inelastic demand.
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within four percent of the actual means. The structural model overpredicts mean
product price in PADD 3 (Gulf Coast) and PADD 1a (New England) by 2.8 cpg and
1.6 cpg, and underpredicts prices in PADD 4 (Rocky Mountains) and PADD 1b (Mid-
Atlantic) by 1.5 and 1.2 cpg. Mean estimates for the PADD 2 (Midwest) and PADD
5 (West Coast) are within 0.5 cpg of the actual means. Mean prices, by formula-
tion, estimated by the structural and reduced-form models are near actual estimates
as well. The largest over- or under-estimation of mean price is that of CARB gasoline,
overestimated by six percent.
Maximum simulated prices are lower than the maximum actual wholesale prices
from 1995 through 2001. The largest deviation exists for ethanol-blended RFG where
the difference between estimated and actual maximum prices is 30 and 27 cpg for
the structural and reduced-form models, respectively. The underestimation is the re-
sult of the simulation not fully predicting the Spring 2000 price spike for ethanol-
blended RFG. While several refinery outages occurred in Spring 2000, these do not
sufficiently explain the large change in the price ethanol-blended RFG.38 During this
period, ethanol-blended RFG was first required to meet more strict federal Phase II
guidelines. Initially, refiners had difficult meeting Phase II emission guidelines while
continuing to use ethanol as an oxygenate. This transition contributed to high prices
of ethanol-blended RFG in Spring 2000, and importantly, as an initial, but not per-
sistent, difficulty with producing ethanol-blended RFG, is not accounted for by the
simulation model. Hence, simulated prices are substantially below actual prices for
ethanol-blended RFG during May 2000.
To assess the degree to which the model accurately captures the effect of outages,
I first-difference the simulated and actual wholesale prices in months with unexpected
local outages. Although the model does not predict the Spring 2000 price spike in the
Midwest, the model does predict wholesale price responses to local outages well. The
simulated mean change in wholesale ethanol-blended RFG prices in months with a local
unexpected outage is 9.91 and 9.90 cents per gallon in Illinois and Wisconsin, which
is close to the actual mean change of 10.08 and 9.71 cents per gallon respectively. For
CARB gasoline, simulated mean change in wholesale prices in months with unexpected
outages of California refineries is 5.91 cents per gallon, relative to an actual mean change
of 6.65 cents per gallon.
8 Simulation Results
Using the NLLS estimates of the cost, conduct and elasticity parameters, I simulate
wholesale prices under several counterfactuals to estimate the degree to which content
regulations, industry consolidation and declining reserve capacity affect price levels
and price spikes. I also test the sensitivity of the simulation results to variations in the
NLLS estimated parameters and modelling assumptions.
8.1 Effects of Gasoline Content Regulation
I estimate the effect of CARB gasoline and ethanol-blended RFG on regional price levels
and the extent to these local content regulations contribute to price spikes caused by
38Contributing factors to the Spring 2000 price spike are qualitatively discussed in Bulow et al (2003) and
FTC (2001).
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refinery outages. To quantify the effect of these regulations, I simulate counterfactual
prices for each of my 78 markets treating CARB and then ethanol-blended RFG as if
the content regulations simply met federal RFG standards. For the counterfactual, I
keep all outages, changes in ownership, capacity additions, and input costs identical
to those in the base case. Thus, the only difference between the base case and initial
counterfactuals is the change in gasoline content regulation.
Treating gasoline standards in California, Illinois and Wisconsin as compatible with
federal RFG standards has three market effects. First, production costs for federal RFG
are lower than those for either CARB gasoline or ethanol-blended RFG. A second re-
lated effect is that increased production costs may cause refineries to make different
production choices under non-outage conditions. Finally, in the event of a local refinery
outages, regional standards prevent adjustment by refiners across geographic markets,
which would occur but for incompatible content regulations. NLLS estimates for cost
parameters identify the first effect, the incremental production costs associated with
CARB or ethanol-blended RFG. I distinguish the second and third effects by identify-
ing months in which unexpected local refinery outages occurred in California, Illinois
and Wisconsin. For months without outages, the first two effects alter prices while for
months with unexpected outages, all three have an effect on the market price.39 Thus,
the average price differential between the base case and counterfactual in months with-
out local outages identify the persistent effects of additional production costs. The
difference in the average price differential in months with local outages and months
without outages identify the effect of incompatible content regulations. For outages
exceeding a month in duration, I only consider the first month of the outage, since
refiners subsequently adjust production mix after the first month to account for the
outage.
I calculate the average differential between the simulated price in the base case,
with existing content regulations in CA, IL and WI, and the simulated price in the
counterfactual, where regulations in CA, IL and WI are compatible with federal-RFG.
In particular, I calculate the average differential conditional on whether or not an
unexpected local outage occurred, as well as unconditional on outage. I list the average
price differentials in Table 8. The differential in months without outages (column 3
in Table 8) identifies the persistent effect of increased production costs. The average
price differential in months with local outages (column 1) identifies the effects of both
increased production costs and content regulations incompatible with federal RFG
criteria.
The point estimates of price effects of additional production costs associated with
content regulations in California, Chicago and Milwaukee are 4.5, 3.0 and 2.9 cents per
gallon. That is, conditional on outage-free operation of all domestic refineries, average
wholesale price in California, Chicago and Milwaukee would be 4.5, 3.0 and 2.9 cents
lower if areas required federal RFG instead of CARB and ethanol-blended RFG re-
spectively. Conditional on a local outage in California, Illinois and Wisconsin, content
regulations inconsistent with federal RFG standards raise wholesale gasoline prices in
California, Chicago and Milwaukee 9.3, 9.6 and 9.9 cents on average.40 Since months
39Note this makes an implicit assumption, supported both by the simulation results and actual data, that
local refinery produce the vast majority of CARB gasoline or ethanol-blended RFG.
40Substantial variation exists across specific local outages - in months with the largest outages in California,
Illinois and Wisconsin, simulated prices with local content regulations are 20 cents per gallon higher than
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with local outages provide a point estimate of the combined effect of increased pro-
duction costs and incompatible regulations, removing the portion of the price changes
attributable to additional production costs provides an estimate of the portion of the
price spikes attributable solely to incompatible fuel regulations. Taking the difference
between the differential contingent on a local outage and the differential contingent on
outage-free operation (ie. the difference between Column 1 and Column 3 in Table
8), I find that incompatible content regulations raise prices 4.8, 6.6 and 7.0 cents per
gallon in California, Illinois and Wisconsin.
Since actual refinery outages vary in severity and duration, the greater effect of fuel
incompatibility in Chicago and Milwaukee could be simply a result of the magnitude of
local refinery outages experienced in Illinois and Wisconsin. That is, if refinery outages
in Illinois and Wisconsin were of greater magnitude or of longer duration than outages
in California, the effect of content regulations would appear greater due entirely to
differences in local outages. As a way to control for the severity and duration of local
shocks, I simulate market prices under another counterfactual, in which local content
regulations exist but no refinery outages occur. Comparing simulated prices in this
counterfactual to those in the base case provides an estimate of the magnitude of the
outages in California, Illinois andWisconsin. For example, to estimate the effect of local
refinery outages on California, I simulate gasoline prices in California without outages
and compare the simulated prices to those from by base case simulation (including
outages). I then calculated the average differential between the two across all periods
in which an unexpected outage occurred at a California refinery. Table 7 lists estimates
equivalent to those in Table 8, with the exception that the counterfactual removes all
outages as opposed to changing fuel compatibility. For example, the value in the upper
left corner of Table 7 is the average price differential in California between months in
which a local outage occurred and those same months but-for the outage. The point
estimates for the effect of local refinery outages are 6.7, 7.3 and 7.7 cents per gallon
for California, Chicago and Milwaukee respectively. This suggests that indeed, local
refinery outages in Illinois and Wisconsin over 1995 to 2001 were of greater magnitude
than local outages in California.
The estimates in Table 7 provide a way to normalize and compare the estimates of
the effect of fuel compatibility across states. Using the calculated magnitude of local
outages in California, Illinois and Wisconsin, I normalize the effect of incompatible
content regulations from Table 8 by the magnitude of the outage in Table 7. Calculating
the ratio of the effect of fuel incompatibility to the effect of the refinery outages gives
an estimate of the proportion of the effect of a local outage which could be mitigated if
local content regulations were compatible with federal RFG standards. The proportion
mitigated by compatibility with federal RFG in California, Illinois and Wisconsin is 72,
91 and 92 percent respectively. That is, in California, of the 6.7 cent per gallon average
simulated increase in price due to local outages, 4.8 cents of the increase (72 percent)
would be avoided if CARB regulations were compatible with federal-RFG standards.
Thus, although refinery outages were of greater magnitude in Chicago and Milwaukee
than in California, fuel compatibility still has a larger effect on prices contingent on
a local refinery outage, even after controlling for outage magnitude. Regardless, these
results imply that price volatility from local refinery outages could be substantially
mitigated by content regulation compatible with federal RFG standards, especially in
simulated prices in the counterfactual.
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the case of Illinois and Wisconsin.
The greater degree to which gasoline compatiblity mitigates price spikes in Chicago
and Milwaukee is consistent with the nature of product differentiation between ethanol-
blended RFG, CARB gasoline and federal RFG. In particular, it depends on the extent
to which California, Illinois and Wisconsin are geographically differentiated from re-
fineries producing federal RFG. Fuel compatibility only mitigates a supply shocks if
transportation costs from refiners producing RFG in other regions are sufficiently low.
In either the case of a local outage in Illinois or a local outage in California, the
lowest-cost alternative source of federal RFG is Texas and Louisiana. If gasoline sold
in Chicago and Milwaukee met federal RFG standards, Gulf Coast refineries produc-
ing federal RFG for the East Coast could shift shipments to Chicago and Milwaukee
via low cost pipelines in response to a refinery outage in Illinois. In contrast, these
refineries ship by barge to California, incurring higher transportation costs, and, as a
result, mitigate less of an outage-based price spike. This indicates that virtually all of
the differentiation for Chicago and Milwaukee ethanol-blended RFG is product differ-
entiation. While product differentiation is important for CARB gasoline, geographic
differentiation also contributes to price spikes in California.
8.2 Additional Counterfactuals
In addition to simulating the effect of incompatible content regulations, I also simulate
two other counterfactuals. First, I estimate the effect of changes in refinery ownership
over the 1995-2001 period on wholesale gasoline prices. Second, I simulate a counter-
factual in which I increase the production capacity of all refineries, to estimate the
effect of declining reserve refining capacity.
8.2.1 Changes in Refinery Concentration
To simulate the effect of changes in refinery ownership, I simulate prices, holding
refinery ownership from January 1995 constant throughout the period. That is, I
simulate prices as if no changes in refinery ownership occurred. All refinery retirements
or capacity additions are kept identical to those actually observed. I first calculate
the average simulated prices under the counterfactual by PADD region (Table 6a) and
product formulation (Table 6b). Comparing the simulated prices for the counterfactual
to the simulated prices for the base case estimates the effect of refinery consolidation
on wholesale prices. Comparing the prices in Tables 6a and 6b, mean wholesale prices
by region are between 0.9 (PADD 3) cents and 1.3 cents (PADD 4) higher with actual
refinery consolidation. Consolidation increases wholesale prices on average from 0.7
cpg (CARB gasoline) to 1.5 cpg (Ethanol blended RFG). Thus, the simulation results
imply that even with refinery divestitures required as part of mergers, changes in
refinery ownership over this period increased prices.
I also estimate the effect of refinery ownership on gasoline price spikes caused by
local refinery outages. In Table 9, I present the average price differential between the
counterfactual and base case for CARB gasoline, Illinois RFG and Wisconsin RFG
contingent and uncontingent on refinery outages. Contingent on a local outage, indus-
try consolidation has a much larger effect on ethanol-blended RFG (4.6 cpg in Illinois)
than on CARB gasoline (0.9 cpg in California). This suggests that refinery owner-
ship consolidation leads to a greater concentration of ethanol-blended RFG production
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locally, relative to CARB gasoline production.
8.2.2 Declining Reserve Refining Capacity
I also simulate a counterfactual testing the effect of declining reserve refining capacity.
In this case, I specify three counterfactuals, increasing light product production capac-
ity of all domestic refineries by 2.5%, 5% and 7.5%.41 Allowing capacity to increase has
two effects - it relaxes the binding capacity constraint at the most efficient refineries
and relaxes the binding capacity constraint in gasoline-importing regions. Increasing
refining capacity should reduce prices in all areas as production is shifted to more
efficient refineries but should also reduce prices relatively more in gasoline-importing
regions. As above, Tables 6a and 6b present the descriptive statistics for the simulated
counterfactual prices by geographic and product market and Table 10 presents the
simulated price differential between the counterfactual and the base case, conditional
and unconditional on refinery outages.
The results in Tables 6a and 6b are consistent with ex ante predictions. Increasing
refinery capacity by five percent lowers prices in all geographic markets between 3.9 and
4.5 cents per gallon. In addition, the districts experiencing the largest price reductions
are the Rocky Mountain states(PADD 4 - 4.5 cpg) and New England (PADD 1a -
4.3 cpg). Capacity-constrained geographic regions benefit from both reallocation of
production to the most efficient refineries and the relaxation of the binding capacity
constraint on local refineries. Areas with excess refining capacity only benefit from the
former.
Increasing production capacity of all refineries by five percent does not effect sub-
stantively which refineries produce CARB or ethanol-blended RFG gasoline. Thus,
the average price differentials reported in Table 10 contingent on a local outage and
contingent on no outages are statistically indistinguishable.
8.3 Sensitivity Analyses
To test the robustness of the estimates in Section 8.1, I test the sensitivity of the sim-
ulated prices to the assumption that refiners place a zero probability prior on refinery
outages and to changes in the estimated cost, conduct and elasticity parameters.
8.3.1 Forward-Looking Refinery Optimization
To test sensitivity of the results to the assumption that refiners place a zero prior
probability on unexpected outages, I simulate a counterfactual in which each risk-
neutral refiner places a common, positive prior on outages at each refinery.42 Each
refiner incorporates these priors into her production choice in the first step of the
optimization problem. I constrain the continuum of all possible outages to a discrete
subset: single, refinery-wide outages. Given the production choices for each element of
the state space (each outage contingency), I identify the initial production choice for
41In the simulation, refinery cost functions are held constant, to control only for the effect of relaxing the
capacity constraint on refineries. Outages are scaled proportionately with increases in capacity.
42The common ex ante outage probability is consistent in expectation with the actual outages observed
over the study period. Numerically, the probability of a refinery-wide outages at each refinery in each period
is 0.0021.
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each market which ex ante maximizes each refiner’s expected profits. I then simulate
prices in each market assuming this initial choice is binding, but allowing the refiners
to reallocate production in response to the actual refinery outages.
Table 11a and 11b compare descriptive statistics for simulated prices under base case
and forward-looking refinery optimization. Simulated mean prices for ethanol-blended
RFG and CARB gasoline are 0.45 cpg and 0.34 cpg lower when refinery optimization
decisions incorporate outages than when they do not. Conventional, RFG, jet fuel and
distillate mean prices are 0.11 cpg lower to 0.07 cpg higher with expected profit maxi-
mization than with profit maximization. This is consistent with ex ante expectations -
since outages have the greatest effect on CARB and ethanol-blended RFG, incorporat-
ing the possibility of outages will increase production of CARB and ethanol-blended
RFG more than other products.
When compared to the magnitude of the effect of incompatible regulations, though,
the modelling assumption I make has an effect an order of magnitude less that then the
effect of incompatible regulations. Several explanations exist for the relatively small
magnitude of the effect. First, while each refiner’s priors of a refinery-wide outage
somewhere in the system in a given month is approximately twenty-five percent, each
refiner’s priors of an outage at a specific refinery is much lower. Since the prior prob-
ability of a local refinery outage in Illinois, Wisconsin or California is relatively low,
refiners rarely benefit from increasing production of CARB or ethanol-blended RFG
above the level of production modelled in the base case.43 Furthermore, capacity con-
straints prevent many refiners from increasing production of CARB or ethanol-blended
RFG without decreasing production of another product. In choosing to produce more
CARB or ethanol-blended RFG, capacity-constrained refineries weigh the benefits of
incremental production in the event of a relevant local refinery outage against the incre-
mental production cost of the special gasoline blend and the shadow cost of additional
refining capacity.
8.3.2 Estimated Structural Parameters
In addition to testing the sensitivity of the simulation results to the assumption of profit
maximization, I also test the sensitivity of the results to variation in the structural
parameter estimates. I focus on the six unobserved parameters which have the largest
effect on simulated CARB and ethanol-blended RFG prices: demand elasticity (), the
competition coefficient (α), the coefficient on crude oil price (β2), RFG production costs
(β4), ethanol-blended RFG production costs (β4) and CARB production costs (β5). For
each of the sensitivity tests, I bound the coefficients at two standard deviations above
and below the NLLS estimate reported in Table 4. Table 12 reports the differential price
effect from gasoline content regulations contingent on a local outage. The differentials
reported in Table 12 are equivalent to the first column in Table 8. Table 13 reports
the percentage of local price volatility mitigated if CARB and ethanol-blended RFG
regulations were compatible with federal RFG.
The first sensitivity analyses test the robustness of the estimates to changes in the
demand elasticity. The effect of content regulations contingent on a local outage is pos-
itively correlated with demand elasticity. If demand curves are less elastic, a supply
43Common refinery priors for an outage in Illinois or Wisconsin is 0.015 and for an outage in California is
0.05.
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shock of similar magnitude has a greater effect on prices. This is consistent with the
results in Table 12, in which the estimated effect of content regulations contingent on
a local outage decrease as demand becomes more elastic. In either case, though, the
estimated proportion of volatility from local outages mitigated by fuel compatibility is
relatively close to the results from the NLLS minimizing parameter vector, 69 and 73
percent for California, 90 to 95 percent for Illinois and 89 to 94 percent for Wisconsin.
In addition to the testing the sensitivity of the simulation results to demand elas-
ticities two standard errors above and below the NLLS point estimate, I also test the
robustness of the simulation results to demand elasticity of -0.23, the median short-run
gasoline demand elasticity estimate across the 363 estimates used for meta-analysis by
Espey(1998). Again, the results are consistent with the intuition that refinery outages
will have a larger effect on prices as demand becomes less elastic.
In general, the other sensitivity results presented in Table 12 are consistent with the
ex ante predictions. Two components drive how variations in the estimated parameters
affect estimates in Table 12: the incremental production costs associated with the
regional content regulations and the degree to which production of the special blend is
concentrated at local refineries. As a result, parameters affecting these two factors have
the greatest effect on the price differential between the base case and counterfactual
simulations. For example, cost coefficients on ethanol-blended RFG and CARB should
be positively correlated with the differentials reported in Table 12, since each represents
the incremental production costs to refiners. Across the sensitivity tests, the effect of
compatibility contingent on local outages varies from 8.5 to 11.0 for California, 7.8 to
11.7 for Illinois and 8.2 to 12.3 for Wisconsin.
While the point estimates of the effect of content regulations contingent on a local
outage vary by twenty percent in some sensitivity tests, the percent of the price volatil-
ity from a local outage mitigated by content regulations, reported in Table 13, seems
fairly robust to changes in the parameters. Across the sensitivity tests, mitigation of
local outages varies from 67 to 74 percent for California, 88 to 98 percent for Illinois
and 90 to 99 percent for Wisconsin. This suggests that, although the magnitude of the
effect of content regulation does vary to a degree, the basic conclusion is robust, that
compatibility with federal RFG has the potential to mitigate a significant proportion
of the effect of local refinery outages, especially in Illinois and Wisconsin.
9 Conclusion
In this paper, I use a structural model of refinery production to estimate two effects
of regional gasoline content regulations on gasoline prices in California, Illinois and
Wisconsin. Using a constructed dataset of refinery outages, I am able to separate the
effect of the regulations on prices through increased production costs and the effect of
the regulations on prices through fuel incompatibility. Point estimates for the effect of
the former are 4.5, 3.0 and 2.9 cents per gallon in California, Illinois and Wisconsin.
The effect of the latter, contingent on a local refinery outage, is estimated as 4.8, 6.6
and 7.1 cents in California, Illinois and Wisconsin. Controlling for the magnitude of
local outages in these areas, I estimate that 72, 91 and 92 percent of price spike created
by a local refinery outage could be mitigated by compatibility with federal reformulated
gasoline. The sensitivity results in section VIII suggest that the conclusions are robust
to changes in parameter estimates and to the assumptions of refiner’s priors regarding
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the probability of unexpected outages. In particular, is seems that across the sensitivity
tests, in all cases gasoline compatibility with federal RFG may play an important role
in moderating price spikes from refinery outages in California, Illinois and Wisconsin.
In addition, I simulate several counterfactuals to estimate the effects on wholesale
prices of changing refinery ownership over 1995 through 2001 and limited additions to
domestic refining capacity. I find that changes in refinery ownership increase prices
by 1.4 to 1.5 cpg in Illinois and Wisconsin and by 0.73 cents per gallon in California.
A five-percent increase in domestic refining capacity reduces prices 3.7 to 3.8 cents
per gallon in Illinois and Wisconsin and 4.3 cents per gallon in California. Looking
across PADD districts, I find that increasing refining capacity lowers prices most in
regions which currently import petroleum products from other regions, namely the
Rocky Mountain states (PADD 4) and the East Coast (PADD 1).
This study raises clear public policy implications. Back of the envelope calculations
estimate the cost, through 2001, of content regulations incompatible with federal RFG
standards in California, Illinois and Wisconsin at $4.3 billion, $670 million and $160
million respectively relative to federal RFG. Since the motivation for these regulations
is to reduce air pollution, it is important to assess whether CARB gasoline and ethanol-
blended RFG constitute cost-effective methods for achieving this goal. To the extent
that supplementary content regulations imposed by these states have little effect on
mobile emissions, lower cost strategies may exist to reduce emissions in these states.
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Table 1: Unexpected Refinery Outages Affecting Production of Light Products.
State Refinery Refiner Outage Nature
Outage 
Date
Repair 
Date
Outage Severity 
(000s/gals/day) Sources
TEXAS Pasadena Crown Central Petro Group Explosion prior to maintenance of distillation tower 23-Nov-01 21-Dec-01 4,200 c
LOUISIANA Lake Charles Citgo Explosion and fire at hydrocracker unit 21-Sep-01 17-Oct-01 1,537 a, c
DELAWARE Delaware City Motiva Maintenace at crude unit due to acid spill 20-Sep-01 10-Oct-01 7,014 c
OKLAHOMA Ponca City Conoco Removal of 54kbbl/day cat cracker from service 16-Aug-01 8-Sep-01 2,268 a
ILLINOIS Lemont PDV America/Citgo Fire at Lemont Refinery crude distillation unit 14-Aug-01 25-Sep-01 7,014 a, b
TEXAS Deer Park deer park ltd Fire closes facility for several days 8-Aug-01 11-Aug-01 13,461 a
DELAWARE Delaware City Motiva Fire and acid spill 17-Jul-01 20-Sep-01 2,338 c
TEXAS Three Rivers Ultramar Diamond Shamrock Fire and Explosion in alkylation unit 9-Jul-01 23-Jul-01 3,755 a, c
TEXAS Port Arthur Blackstone Group Lightning strike necessitates maintenance of distillation tower 1-May-01 7/6/2001 840 a
UTAH Woods Cross Inland Fire prompts water upgrade 4-Jul-01 4-Aug-01 437 a
LOUISIANA Norco Orion Lightning strikes gasoline storage tank 7-Jun-01 10-Jun-01 3,255 a, b, c
CALIFORNIA Los Angeles BP Fire at catalytic cracking unit 26-May-01 10-Jun-01 4,032 b
ALABAMA Tuscoloosa Hunt Refining Major fire at refinery 13-May-01 15-May-01 1,092 a, b
ILLINOIS Wood River Tosco Fire in pump of distillation unit. 28-Apr-01 22-May-01 5,282 a, b
CALIFORNIA Benicia ExxonMobil Delayed restart to Benecia 1-Mar-01 1-Apr-01 5,670 a
ILLINOIS Blue Island Clark Refinery upgrades. 1-Jan-01 1-Oct-01 3,041 a
PENNSYLVANIA Philadelphia Sunoco Fire at distillation tower. 7-Sep-00 28-Sep-00 5,460 c, d
ILLINOIS Robinson Marathon Ashland Fire at reformer and hydrocracker. 5-Aug-00 5-Sep-00 1,050 c
PENNSYLVANIA Philadelphia Sunoco Catalyst release shuts down catalytic cracking unit 21-Jun-00 5-Jul-00 4,767 c
LOUISIANA Norco Orion Explosion of diesel fuel. 10-Jun-00 24-Jun-00 3,612 a
TEXAS Port Arthur Blackstone Group Unscheduled outage of distillation unit. 25-May-00 5-Jun-00 8,337 d
LOUISIANA Shreveport Pennzoil Naphtha explosion. 18-Jan-00 2-Feb-00 1,281 a, b, d
OHIO Toledo Sunoco Fire and small explosion near distillation tower. 28-Aug-99 11-Sep-99 3,028 b, d
ALABAMA Tuscoloosa Hunt Refining Fire in processing facility. 18-Aug-99 31-Aug-99 1,092 a
CALIFORNIA Richmond Chevron Fire at refinery. 10-Jul-99 15-Aug-99 5,040 a, d
TENNESSEE Memphis Williams Fire at catalytic cracking unit 16-Jun-99 21-Jun-99 2,688 a
TEXAS Corpus Christi Coastal Corp Fire at reformer. 14-May-99 14-Jun-99 630 a
INDIANA Whiting BP Explosion from leaking jet fuel at catalytic cracker. 20-Apr-99 15-May-99 6,586 a
CALIFORNIA Los Angeles Arco Failure of cogeneration plant halts operation. 27-Mar-99 29-Mar-99 10,731 a
CALIFORNIA Richmond Chevron Fire and explosion in hydrocracking unit. 26-Mar-99 1-Mar-00 1,722 a, d
CALIFORNIA Avon Tosco Fire and explosion at distillation tower. 23-Feb-99 1-Aug-99 6,897 a, c
ILLINOIS Lemont Citgo Fire at distillation unit. 23-Feb-99 6-Mar-99 7,014 a
ARKANSAS Smackover Cross Petrol Explosion at Naphtha tank. 13-Jan-99 10-Feb-99 235 a
LOUISIANA Belle Chasse BP Fire at refinery. 2-Oct-98 5-Oct-98 9,862 a
OKLAHOMA Ardmore Ultramar Diamond Shamrock Fire and power failure at distillation tower. 13-Jul-98 18-Sep-98 2,856 b, d
PENNSYLVANIA Philadelphia Sunoco Power outage necessitates maintenance of catalytic cracker. 26-Jun-98 25-Jul-98 3,066 d
CALIFORNIA Avon Tosco Explosion at hydrocracker. 22-Jan-97 24-Jan-97 2,688 a, d
NEW JERSEY Bayway Tosco Unscheduled maintenance of catalytic cracker. 1-Jan-97 22-Jan-97 5,796 d
ILLINOIS Blue Island clark oil Propane fire spurs damages electrical systems. 19-Oct-96 8-Nov-96 1,303 a, d
OHIO toledo BP Fire at refinery. 15-Oct-96 23-Oct-96 5,880 a
MINNESOTA Pine Bend Koch Lightning necessitates shutdown of distillation unit. 21-May-96 31-May-96 10,080 a
CALIFORNIA Martinez Shell Explosion at hydrotreater. 1-Apr-96 22-Apr-96 3,173 a
COLORADO Commerce City TPI Fire at refinery. 5-Feb-96 19-Feb-96 1,806 a
TEXAS Texas City Amoco Explosion and fire at catalytic cracker at largest US refinery. 25-Jul-95 25-Aug-95 4,070 a
Sources:
(a) Local News Sources
(b) US Chemical Safety Board, Chemical Incident Report Center
(c ) Monthly Incident Reports from www.acusafe.com
(d) SEC filings.
Table 2: Reduced Form Summary Statistics
Variables Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Gasoline Prices
DTW Price 79.31 17.81 37.90 151.80
Rack Price 71.99 17.73 34.40 147.90
Retail Price 87.83 18.23 47.40 159.70
Gasoline Volumes
Conventional Volume 5,319.3 4,640.1 97.4 21,916.1
Oxygenated Volume 2,053.5 2,539.6 0.6 15,720.7
Reformulated Volume 4,746.8 4,996.7 0.9 40,564.6
Content Regulations
RFG Dummy 0.31 0.46 0.00 1.00
Oxygenated Dummy 0.22 0.41 0.00 1.00
Ethanol Blended RFG Dummy 0.02 0.13 0.00 1.00
Federal Phase 2 RFG Dummy 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00
Federal Phase 1 RFG Dummy 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00
CARB Dummy 0.01 0.09 0.00 1.00
Mandatory Ethanol Dummy 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00
Mandatory Oxygenation Percentage 0.45 0.88 0.00 3.50
Demand Instruments
State Population (millions) 7.28 7.50 0.63 33.90
Population Density 190.6 252.2 1.1 1,143.7
Per Capita Income (000s) 23.82 4.56 15.22 40.64
Total Licensed Drivers (millions) 3.87 4.03 0.34 22.40
Registered Autos Per Person 0.70 0.10 0.43 0.96
Registered Buses Per Person 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Registered Motorcycles Per Person 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.07
State Tax 19.83 4.99 7.50 39.00
Federal Gasoline Tax 18.36 0.05 18.30 18.40
Cents Per Gallon Tax 38.19 4.99 25.80 57.30
Crude Spot Prices
Cushing WTI Spot Price 50.50 11.22 26.99 81.95
Brent North Shore Spot Price 46.91 11.23 23.39 78.57
Table 3: Reduced-Form Regressions Results
Dependent Variable: Monthly Average Real Rack Price Net of State and Federal Taxes (cents/gallon)
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
CONSTANT 12.550** 61.237** 6.617**
1.377 0.721 1.428
QUANTITY 0.00047** -0.00058** -0.00037*
0.00015 0.00009 0.00013
WTI MONTHLY CRUDE PRICE 1.159** 1.177**
0.013 0.009
OXYDUMMY 3.495** 4.696** 4.947**
0.754 0.437** 0.513
RFGDUMMY 3.839** 4.065** 4.238**
0.552 0.261 0.354
RFGETHDUMMY^ 1.836 1.855* 1.675
1.793 0.833 1.118
CARBDUMMY^ 3.184 5.646** 5.050*
2.036 1.677 1.974
Geographic Dummy Variables State State State
Temporal Dummy Variables - Month-Year State-Month
R-Squared 0.7902 0.9390 0.8722
Estimated Rho 0.615 0.534 0.471
Notes: 
* denotes significance at 5% level
** denotes significance at 1% level
^ Both Ethanol requirements for gasoline and CARB gasoline requirements are treated additively to the RFGDUM
   (e.g. Holding all else equal, CARB gasoline prices are greater than conventional gasoline 
    prices by the sum of the coefficients on RFGDUMMY and CARBDUMMY.)
Specification
Table 4: NLLS Parameter Estimates
Variable Parameter Coefficient Standard Error
Demand Elasticity epsilon 0.337 0.004
Competition Coefficient alpha 0.031 0.003
Cost Function Parameters
Marginal Cost Parameter beta0 0.436 0.028
Log(Distillation Capacity) beta1 -0.867 0.023
WTI Crude Price beta2 0.765 0.008
RFG Dummy beta3 5.009 0.383
Ethanol-blended RFG Dummy beta4 8.210 0.737
CARB Dummy beta5 10.517 0.374
Jet Fuel Dummy beta6 -1.758 0.209
No. 2 Distillate Dummy beta7 -3.996 0.179
R-squared (quantities) 0.998
R-squared (prices) 0.926
Note: Coefficients jointly minimize NLLS.  Solution based on gradient of steepest ascent numerical search algorithm.
Table 5a: Descriptive Statistics by PADD and Estimation Technique
1a 1b 1c 2 3 4 5
Actual Prices
Mean 69.56 68.82 66.74 70.35 66.12 74.84 74.91
Standard Deviation 16.67 16.95 16.36 18.28 16.61 17.26 18.82
Max 121.00 119.30 116.20 147.90 114.20 124.20 130.80
Min 34.50 33.40 34.00 34.70 31.60 38.40 40.20
Estimated Prices - Structural Model
Mean 71.17 67.62 67.35 69.92 68.99 73.29 75.14
Standard Deviation 14.73 14.74 14.67 16.64 15.56 17.39 16.99
Max 108.45 104.37 104.16 117.02 108.55 117.57 128.56
Min 35.06 32.50 32.60 33.63 32.52 33.33 33.20
Estimated Prices - Reduced Form Model 1
Mean 70.82 70.42 67.93 70.89 68.48 75.52 76.94
Standard Deviation 16.50 16.89 16.75 17.13 16.71 16.20 16.69
Max 118.94 117.73 116.01 120.73 117.94 123.52 125.96
Min 38.05 36.02 35.55 36.04 34.85 39.86 43.00
Table 5b: Descriptive Statistics by Formulation and Estimation Technique
Conventional RFG
Ethanol-
Blended RFG CARB Gasoline Jet Fuel Distillate
Actual Prices
Mean 70.24 72.54 75.85 81.81 65.72 64.35
Standard Deviation 17.25 17.75 19.69 20.81 16.96 17.13
Max 129.20 139.30 147.90 130.80 115.80 120.30
Min 34.40 38.50 43.00 49.40 31.60 31.70
Estimated Prices - Structural Model
Mean 69.88 73.28 76.83 87.49 66.98 65.12
Standard Deviation 15.94 15.30 17.19 16.50 15.42 15.61
Max 117.57 118.64 117.02 128.56 111.61 109.41
Min 34.48 39.04 45.37 49.59 32.93 32.50
Estimated Prices - Reduced Form Model 1
Mean 70.52 72.69 75.75 82.59
Standard Deviation 16.87 17.03 17.32 17.85
Max 124.94 125.96 120.73 125.76
Min 34.85 39.31 43.36 49.39
PADD Region
Formulation
Table 6a: Counterfactual Results - Mean Wholesale Price by PADD
Simulation Run 1a 1b 1c 2 3 4 5
Base Case 71.17 67.62 67.35 69.92 68.99 73.29 75.14
Counterfactuals
CARB Compatibility 71.45 67.92 67.49 70.03 69.12 73.36 74.87
Ethanol-Blended RFG Compatibility 71.16 67.93 67.15 69.72 68.53 73.75 75.21
Constant Refinery Ownership 70.22 66.52 66.35 68.68 68.06 72.04 73.98
2.5% Additional Refining Capacity 68.90 65.42 65.08 67.86 66.74 70.84 73.08
5.0% Additional Refining Capacity 66.93 63.49 63.07 66.02 64.72 68.76 71.29
7.5% Additional Refining Capacity 65.17 61.75 61.26 64.38 62.92 67.13 69.94
Table 6b: Counterfactual Results - Mean Wholesale Price by Formulation
Simulation Run Conventional RFG
Ethanol-
Blended RFG CARB Gasoline Jet Fuel Distillate
Base Case 69.88 73.28 76.83 87.49 66.98 65.12
Counterfactuals
CARB Compatibility 69.99 73.75 76.78 82.13 67.11 65.25
Ethanol-Blended RFG Compatibility 69.94 73.15 72.88 87.52 67.34 65.27
Constant Refinery Ownership 68.75 72.26 75.36 86.76 65.87 64.01
2.5% Additional Refining Capacity 67.73 71.08 74.88 85.21 64.65 62.80
5.0% Additional Refining Capacity 65.83 69.15 73.06 83.22 62.62 60.77
7.5% Additional Refining Capacity 64.18 67.42 71.61 81.51 60.89 59.05
PADD Region
Formulation
Table 7: Simulated Wholesale Price Differential Due to Unexpected Refinery Outages
(cents per gallon, standard errors in parenthses)
State Local Outage Regional Outage No Refinery Outage Unconditional
California 6.68 0.07 0.85
(0.08) (0.001) (0.02)
Illinois 7.28 2.38 -0.02 0.88
(0.27) (0.04) (0.08) (0.13)
Wisconsin 7.72 3.47 0.00 1.46
(0.28) (0.07) (0.10) (0.16)
Table 8: Simulated Wholesale Price Differential Due to Fuel Compatibility
(cents per gallon, standard errors in parenthses)
State Local Outage Regional Outage No Refinery Outage Unconditional
California 9.26 4.46 5.36
(0.47) (0.40) (0.43)
Illinois 9.57 4.71 2.97 3.76
(0.72) (0.76) (0.83) (0.70)
Wisconsin 9.92 5.01 2.86 4.17
(0.71) (0.79) (0.84) (0.68)
Table 9: Simulated Wholesale Price Differential Due to Refinery Consolidation
(cents per gallon, standard errors in parenthses)
State Local Outage Regional Outage No Refinery Outage Unconditional
California 1.41 0.54 0.73
(0.11) (0.07) (0.08)
Illinois 6.02 1.30 0.39 1.40
(0.58) (0.21) (0.08) (0.17)
Wisconsin 5.45 1.11 0.65 1.54
(0.56) (0.21) (0.10) (0.19)
Table 10: Simulated Wholesale Price Differential Due from Five Percent Increase in Refining Capacity
(cents per gallon, standard errors in parenthses)
State Local Outage Regional Outage No Refinery Outage Unconditional
California 3.90 4.47 4.27
(0.51) (0.29) (0.32)
Illinois 3.85 4.31 3.86 3.78
(1.27) (1.08) (0.18) (0.18)
Wisconsin 3.91 4.39 3.85 3.75
(1.21) (1.08) (0.22) (0.22)
Note: Local outages for California are defined as in-state outages.  Local outages for Illinois and Wisconsin are defined as
outages in either Illinois or Wisconsin.  Regional outages for Illinois and Wisconsin are non-local outages occurring within PADD 2.
Conditional on Outage Type
Conditional on Outage Type
Conditional on Outage Type
Conditional on Outage Type
Table 11a: Descriptive Statistics For Simulations Based on Profit and Expected Profit Maximization, by PADD
1a 1b 1c 2 3 4 5
Simulated Prices Based on Refinery Profit Maximization
Mean 71.17 67.62 67.35 69.92 68.99 73.29 75.14
Standard Deviation 14.73 14.74 14.67 16.64 15.56 17.39 16.99
Max 108.45 104.37 104.16 117.02 108.55 117.57 128.56
Min 35.06 32.50 32.60 33.63 32.52 33.33 33.20
Simulated Prices Based on Refinery Expected Profit Maximization
Mean 71.44 67.50 66.77 70.01 68.56 73.85 74.82
Standard Deviation 14.61 14.73 14.62 16.46 15.57 17.08 16.96
Max 108.24 104.16 103.96 116.76 108.36 117.32 128.16
Min 35.03 32.47 32.57 33.60 32.48 33.96 33.20
Table 11b: Descriptive Statistics For Simulations Based on Profit and Expected Profit Maximization, by Formulation
Conventional RFG
Ethanol-
Blended RFG CARB Gasoline Jet Fuel Distillate
Simulated Prices Based on Refinery Profit Maximization
Mean 69.88 73.28 76.83 87.49 66.98 65.12
Standard Deviation 15.94 15.30 17.19 16.50 15.42 15.61
Max 117.57 118.64 117.02 128.56 111.61 109.41
Min 34.48 39.04 45.37 49.59 32.93 32.50
Simulated Prices Based on Refinery Expected Profit Maximization
Mean 69.77 73.35 76.38 87.15 67.03 65.12
Standard Deviation 15.89 15.19 17.10 16.41 15.28 15.44
Max 117.32 118.52 116.76 128.16 111.45 107.81
Min 34.74 39.12 45.91 49.59 32.92 32.47
PADD Region
Formulation
Table 12: Simulated Wholesale Price Effect Due to Fuel Compatibility Contingent on Local Outage
Parameter Initial Value Adjusted Value California Illinois Wisconsin
Base Case 9.3 9.6 9.9
Demand Elasticity -0.337 -0.230 11.0 11.7 12.3
Demand Elasticity -0.337 -0.329 9.2 9.9 10.2
Demand Elasticity -0.337 -0.346 9.2 9.3 9.5
Competition Coefficient 0.031 0.0359 9.4 7.8 8.2
Competition Coefficient 0.031 0.0251 9.2 9.3 9.7
WTI Crude Price 0.765 0.780 9.4 9.6 9.8
WTI Crude Price 0.765 0.749 9.3 9.6 9.9
Federal RFG MC Dummy 5.009 5.7753 8.5 8.9 9.2
Federal RFG MC Dummy 5.009 4.2429 9.9 10.3 10.7
Ethanol RFG MC Dummy 8.210 9.685 9.1 10.9 11.3
Ethanol RFG MC Dummy 8.210 6.735 9.3 8.3 8.6
CARB MC Dummy 10.517 11.264 10.0 9.7 9.9
CARB MC Dummy 10.517 9.770 8.7 9.7 10.0
Note: Sensitivity results based on simulations deviating from structural model parameter estimates.
Wholesale Price Differential Due to Fuel Compatibility Contingent on Local Outage
Table 13: Simulated Price Volatility From Local Outage Mitigated By Compatible Regulations
Parameter Initial Value Adjusted Value California Illinois Wisconsin
Base Case 72% 91% 92%
Demand Elasticity -0.337 -0.230 67% 98% 99%
Demand Elasticity -0.337 -0.329 69% 95% 94%
Demand Elasticity -0.337 -0.346 73% 90% 89%
Competition Coefficient 0.031 0.0359 74% 88% 90%
Competition Coefficient 0.031 0.0251 70% 92% 92%
WTI Crude Price 0.765 0.780 74% 94% 93%
WTI Crude Price 0.765 0.749 72% 93% 92%
Federal RFG MC Dummy 5.009 5.7753 70% 91% 92%
Federal RFG MC Dummy 5.009 4.2429 72% 92% 93%
Ethanol RFG MC Dummy 8.210 9.685 70% 91% 92%
Ethanol RFG MC Dummy 8.210 6.735 73% 92% 92%
CARB MC Dummy 10.517 11.264 73% 93% 93%
CARB MC Dummy 10.517 9.770 72% 92% 92%
Note: Sensitivity results based on simulations deviating from structural model parameter estimates.
Percent of Outage Price Volatility Mitigated By Federal-RFG Compatibility
Figure 1: Average Monthly Prices for Crude Oil, 
CARB gasoline and Illinois Ethanol-Blended RFG
Jan 1995 - Dec 2003
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Figure 2: CARB/WTI Spot and IL RFG/WTI Spot Differentials
Jan 1995 - Dec 2003
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